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In studies of war it is important to observe that the processes leading to so frequent an event as conflict are not necessarily those that lead to so infrequent an event as war. Also, many models fail to recognize that a phenomenon irregularly distributed in time and space, such as war, cannot be explained on the basis of relatively invariant phenomena. Much Further, these two scholars arrived at a judgment that was not only generous, but probably correct: that the problem lay not so much with the stupidity or ambition of the foreign policy elites, but more with their ignorance. In addition, they observed that this ignorance was not peculiar to the practitioners alone; the scholarly community was hardly better off.
Having arrived at these general conclusions, it was natural that they would then have some caustic observations on the absence of evidence, and the heavy reliance on 'brilliant, witty political discussion' (Richardson, 1960a, p. v.) (Blainey, 1973) , surplus capital (Lenin, 1939) , business cycles (Secerov,1919) , demographic pressures (Organski, 1968) , resource needs (Choucri & North, 1975) , elite personalities (Stoessinger, 1978) , national moods (Klingberg, 1952; McCIelland, 1961) , misperceptions (White, 1968) , and so forth. (Morgenthau, 1948) or territory (Ardrey, 1966) , the instinct of aggressiveness (Lorenz, 1967) , or libidinous drive (Fomari, 1974) .
In addition to the fact that most of the above orientations are rarely examined empirically, are seldom related to other explanations (Nelson & Olin, 1979; Silberner, 1946) (Singer, 1971) , but its bare outlines can be summarized here. (Blechman & Kaplan, 1978; Bloomfield & Leiss, 1969; Bouthoul, 1951; Kende, 1971; Urlanis, 1960 (Hart, 1946; Sorokin, 1937) (Rosenau, 1966 (Zinnes, 1980a (Sullivan, 1976 Ostrom and Aldrich (1978, p. 765) summarize things best in reporting that 'our results have a distinctly negative flavor'.
As might be expected, there are several interesting extensions of the bipolarity-war hypothesis. The simplest is that since alliances involving one set of major powers will generally be in opposition to other majors, the greater the percentage of major powers in alliance, the greater the bipolarity of the system as a whole, and thus the greater (or lesser) will be the incidence of war in the ensuing years. Once again, the empirical findings are mixed; Singer and Small (1968) found that their alliance aggregation indicator, which was indeed highly correlated with their bipolarity index, predicted positively to the incidence of war in the 1900-1945 period, but negatively in the 1816-1899 period. Imposing more stringent analytical tests and slightly different indicators, Ostrom and Hole (1978) (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972 Wayman (1980) found that wars oc-curring under conditions of high concentration are less severe than those occurring when capabilities are more evenly distributed.
Another factor -related to the others in the sense that it taps the structural clarity dimension -is that of status inconsistency, aggregated to the systemic level. In two of the earlier investigations, Wallace (1971) and East (1972) found moderately clear associations between the incidence of international war and the extent to which the rank scores of the nations on the material capability and diplomatic importance dimensions were inconsistent with one another.
That is, the more similar the systemic pecking orders on power and on prestige, the less war-prone the system was in the years following. On the other hand, the inquiries by Ray (1974) (Harary, 1961) , most of the databased work has been restricted to the more manageable 'two-body problem', to borrow from the vocabulary of physics. Following the distinction noted earlier, we will treat dyadic conditions of a relational sort first, and then turn to those of a comparative sort, resting not on the links, but on the similarities, between nations.
As to the former, we again find the familiar emphasis upon alliance bonds, followed by the bonds created via membership in discernible diplomatic clusters, trading blocs, and international organizations. First, we discover that, in general, nations with formal and long-standing alliance bonds experience a significantly higher frequency of war than do those without them (Small & Singer, 1966) ; on the other hand, Sabrosky (1980) found that nations that were allied to one another had a very low probability of going to war against one another. Neither case suggests anything as to the intentions of the alliance makers (Singer & Bueno de Mesquita, 1973) . Looking at another type of bond, Skjelsbaek (1971) Barringer (1972) and (1977) found that serious disputes were more likely to escalate to war if the weak side was the initiator of the dispute; disputes initiated by the stronger side were less likely to end in war. Mihalka (1976) found that once military force was threatened or used, the greater the disparity in capabilities of the disputants, the less likely the dispute was to escalate to hostilities. More recently, Singer and his colleagues (1979a) found that while only 13 % of all major power militarized disputes since 1816 escalated to war, that figure rose to 20 % when the parties were approximately equal in military terms, and to 75 % if such parity was combined with rapid military buildup during the three years prior to the dispute.
A second emphasis in this literature is more diffuse, but worth noting briefly, given the theoretical pervasiveness of its assumptions. That is, the more similar two nations are in terms of certain political or cultural attributes, the more friendly their relationship might be expected to be, and the more friendly they are, the less frequently or severely might they be expected to wage war against one another. Here, too, Richardson (1960a) was the first to look into the question systematically, and he found little historical evidence to support the classical view. For the period 1820-1949 and using his population of 300-odd wars and military disputes, he found that neither a common language nor a common religion had a depressing effect on the incidence of dyadic war (pp. 230-31) . To the contrary, as he himself demonstrated (pp. 285-86) and as others have confirmed (Gleditsch and Singer, 1975) , geographical contiguity is the confounding variable. That is, since geographical neigbors are not only more likely to be culturally similar but also to have more sources of conflict and to be more accessible to one another's armies, it follows that such similarities should actually be related to dyadic war in the positive direction (Gantzel, 1972 (1978) do not. Rather, they find an inverse relationship between a nation's war proneness and the number of immediate neighbors. Nor should these results be surprising, when we consider that the number of direct neighbors is physically a function of a land-locked nation's gcographic size vis-a-vis that of its neighbors. The longer its boundaries, the greater the number of others that can border on it, and the smaller these latter are, the more numerous they can be. From this, it follows that the greater will be the discrepancy between its size (and strength, all else being equal) and theirs, and given the finding that war is more likely between equals, it again follows that the frequency of war should be lower.
National attributes and relationships
In an earlier section I indicated that national attributes seemed less crucial in accounting for war than either systemic or dyadic conditions, and before summarizing the evidence to date, let me expand on that assertion. Briefly put, the exigencies of survival in an international system of such inadequate organization and with so pervasively dysfunc- (Naroll, 1969; Choucri and North, 1975; Small, 1978; Weede, 1970 (Sabrosky, 1980 Richardson (1960a) found a positive relationship between the number of neighbors a nation had and the frequency of its wars from 1820 to 1945, and Wesley (1969) , Weede (1970) , Midlarsky (1975) , and Starr and Most (1978) found relatively similar patterns for comparable spatial-temporal domains. Finally, Gleditsch and Singer (1975) examined the effect of a nation's mean distance from all other sovereign members of the system, and they, too, found a positive relationship; the more centrally located they were, the more war they experienced.
The tentative inference from this limited set of studies is that such basic geo-strategic factors as location and strength seem to be of importance, but that despite persuasive arguments to the contrary (Rosenau, 1966) (Burton, 1962; Hoffmann, 1965; Holsti, 1972; Kaplan, 1957; Wallensteen, 1973; Midlarsky, 1975; Russett, 1974 (Alker and Brunner, 1969; Bremer, 1977 
